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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In response to a request received from the Clerk of the 
above entitled Court, Appellants submit herewith a Supple-
4 
mental Brief in connection with the cases set forth above, on 
the following question: 
"Does the inclusion of premium payments in the 
base for assessment and taxation of mines violate the 
constitutional requirements as to uniformity of assess-
ment and taxation, as set forth in Sections 2, 3, and 4, of 
Article XIII of the Constitution of Utah?" 
The question being the same for each case, and both cases 
having heretofore been combined for argument, this brief is 
submitted jointly, and in typewritten form. Printed briefs will 
be substituted as soon as they come from the press. 
As we understand the question submitted, the Court de-
sires to receive further assistance from counsel for the respec-
tive parties as to whether a construction of Sections 80-5-56 and 
80-5-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, so as to include "premium 
payments" as a part of the gross proceeds realized by the re-
spective mining companies, would violate the provisions of 
Sections 2, 3, and 4, Article XIII, of the Constitution of Utah. 
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII relate to the uniformity of as-
sessment of all tangible property of the State, while Section 4 
provides specifically how metalliferous mines or mining claims 
shall be assessed. The question of whether under the latter sec-
tion the Legislature might provide for the assessment of metalli-
ferous mines or mining claims on a basis which would result in 
a lack of uniformity need not here be considered, since, as we 
view the matter, the inclusion of "permium payments" as a part 
of the gross proceeds realized by the respective mining com-
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panics from their ores produced in the calendar year in question 
not only results in uniformity as to determining "net proceeds", 
but that the failure to so include such payments would result 
in discrimination as to the several mining companies when "net 
proceeds" are determined. 
Counsel for United States Smelting, Refining and Mining 
Company, in their Answering Brief in case No. 6931, heretofore 
filed posed a similar question to the one submitted by the Court 
and in that brief attempted to show that the inclusion of "pre-
mium payments" in the gross proceeds of the several mining 
companies would violate "the Constitutional and Statutory Re-
quirements as to Uniformity of Assessment and Taxatinon." 
(Respondent's Brief, page 21 et seq.). We will, therefore, 
proceed to answer the argument therein set forth before setting 
forth our affirmative argument as indicated. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Respondent first states positively that "A mine would 
have a greater value in 1944 if it produced no ores in 1941 than 
it would have had had it produced ores in 1941." This may or 
may not be true. But it would not have a greater value in 1944 
solely because it had no ore production in 1941. Counsel seem 
to think that quotas were fixed on the basis of 1941 production 
of ores, solely, but such an assumption is fallacious. Both of 
the mining companies here concerned had ore production in 
1941, but were assigned zero quotas with respect to at least 
some of the metals involved. The stipulation of facts will re-
veal other companies similarly situated. In every instance, we 
are told, the quotas were determined on a basis best calculated 
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to increase production of ores and compensate the mining com-
panies for such ore production, on a reasonable basis - to offset 
their increased costs of production, to permit them a reasonable 
profit on the extraction of sub-marginal ores, and otherwise 
compensate the mines for their greater ore production to assist 
the war effort. Regardless of the ore production of a mine in 
1941, its quota was determined by the Committee after negotiat-
ing with the mine officials with the end in view to allow each 
mine a sufficient sum for its ore produced as to encourage 
greater and greater production, without, at the same time, allow-
ing such mine to take advantage of a greater demand for such 
critical materials to the end that it would profit unjustly from 
the war effort. 
2. While it is true that "two mines producing exactly the 
same quantity of copper, lead or zinc in 1944 would have 
different values, depending upon the quotas assigned to them," 
it is also true that such mines would have different values 
even though their quotas were exactly the same. Mine "A" in 
order to have the same value as Mine "B" would have to have 
not only the same production of ore and the same quota 
assigned by Metals Reserve Company, but would also have to 
have the same identical costs of production, the same smelting 
contract with the smelter; and if Mine "B" was a custom 
shipper, Mine "A" would likewise have to be a custom smelter. 
In other words, ALL of the factors involved in arriving at 
"net proceeds" would have to be identically the same with 
respect to Mines "A" and 'B'" in order for them to have the 
same value. This matter will be discussed more fully herein-
after. 
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3. Counsel next argue that "the more it costs to produce 
ore from a mine the more valuable the mine would be." But 
again they fail to take into consideration that under the 
provisions of Section 80-5-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
"net annual proceeds" are calculated by deducting from gross 
receipts the various costs of production set forth in that section. 
Among those deductions are: ( 1) "Amount of money actually 
expended during the year for labor, tools, appliances and 
supplies used in the mining operations, including the labor of 
the lessee and his employees;" (2) "The actual and necessary 
office and clerical expenses and the salaries of employees, other 
than corporate officers, within the state;" ( 3) "The actual cost 
of the installation, construction, maintenance and repair of 
machinery and improvements made during the year in and 
about the workings of the mine for use in extracting the ores;" 
( 4) "The actual cost of reduction works, and improvements 
thereof, constructed during the year and operated in connection 
with the mine;" ( 5) "The actual cost of the transportation of 
the ore from the mine to the market or reduction works;" and 
many other items. 
One of the pnmary purposes m granting and making 
premium payments to the mining companies (after ceiling 
prices on the various ores had been fixed) was to compensate 
the several companies for their increased costs of production, 
including increased labor costs, increased costs of materials, 
etc. Yet Respondents would take the position that they are 
entitled to deduct such costs of production, and all of such 
costs, without including as a part of gross receipts such premium 
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payments as were received, and without which payments there 
would have been no production of ore for the reason that the 
0. P. A. ceiling price would have been insufficient to take care 
of the production costs. 
We call attention at this point to what has occurred since 
the ceiling prices have been removed on the ores produced 
by Respondents and others. The price of copper has increased 
above that received during the War both from the smelter 
and from Metals Reserve Company, it being now 19lfz cents 
per pound. Likewise with Lead which is now quoted at 11.65 
cents and zinc which is quoted at 10.5 cents per pound. We do 
not know whether the cost of production to the several mining 
companies has increased since ceilings have been removed, 
but certainly no contention will be made that the gross proceeds 
now being received from ore production is not the total amount 
received from all sources on account of such ores produced. 
Now, then can Respondents contend that when a lesser amount 
was actually received for the same production in the forepart 
of the year 1946, only part of such receipts are "gross proceeds." 
The foregoing facts are within the common knowledge of 
everyone and are called to the court's attention merely for 
the purpose of illustrating the mconsistency of the position 
taken by the mining companies in the several cases pending in 
the courts. 
Having disposed of counsel's arguments contained 111 
their brief heretofore filed in Case No. 6931, we proceed to 
a discussion of the Main Issues: 
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A Construction of the Statutes of Utah so as to Require 
the Inclusion of "Premium Payments" as a part of the 
"Gross Proceeds" realized from Ores produced would 
not violate the provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4, Article 
XIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
At the outset, it must be remembered that while Sections 
2 and 3 of Article XIII of the State Constitution require uni-
formity of assessment of all tangible property of the State, 
Section 4 applies specifically to the assessment of metalliferous 
mines and mining claims and authorizes their assessment "as 
the Legislature shall provide." Therefore, the fact that the 
Legislature has provided for the assessment of such mines and 
mining claims by an entirely different formula than that applied 
to other property, does not violate the provisions of Sections 
2 and 3. Such was the holding of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the case of South Utah Mines & Smelters 
vs. Beaver County, 262 U. S. 325, 67 L. ed. 1004: 
"The state constitution plainly contemplates that 
all property, irrespective of its character, shall be taxed 
'according to its value in money.' The provisions with 
reference to the taxation of metalliferous mines does not 
mean to depart from this rule, but recognizes that their 
value cannot be determined in the ordinary way, since 
the ores which constitute the wealth of such property 
are hidden in the earth, and, as a general thing, disclos-
ure of their extent and character must await extraction. 
The Constitution, therefore, provides, not for disregard-
ing value in the assessment of taxes upon mines, but for 
arriving at it in a special manner- that is, by a measure-
ment proportioned to the net annual proceeds derived 
from the property. The 11alue of property bears a relation 
to the income which it affords ... The constitutional 
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provision, therefore, at best, will produce only approxi-
mate equality. Undoubtedly in fixing the multiple of 
the net annual proceeds upon which the value of metalli-
ferous mines is to be calculated a good deal of latitude 
must be allowed the Legislature and the taxing authori-
ties, but the power is not unbounded." 
This same principal was enunciated by the Montana Su-
preme Court in the case of Byrne v. Fulton Oil Company, 85 
Mont. 329,278 P. 514, as follows: 
"The net proceeds tax is simply a tax in lieu of, or as a 
substitute for, the ad valorum tax on the value of mines 
or mining interests." (Citing Salt Lake County vs. Utah 
Copper Company, 294 Fed. 199.) 
Not only have "proceeds" been the formula for deter-
mining mining value for taxation purposes in connection with 
metalliferous mines and mining claims, it has also been applied 
for determining values for public utilities such as railroads, 
motor carriers, and other activities. In each instance it is not 
whether the different companies or individuals within the 
class have the same income or "proceeds" but whether the rule 
applies uniformly to all such individuals or companies within 
such class. 
At a glance, it is clear that our Statutes relating to 
assessment of metalliferous mines and mining claims, apply 
alike to Respondents and other mining cmpanies. The same 
formula is applied to each company in the same manner-
that is, as stated by the Supreme Court in South Utah .Mines 
& Smelters v. Beaver County, supra, "\'Vhat arc the net annual 
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proceeds derived from the property?" In each instance all 
income received from mining operations-that is, production 
of ores-is calculated to determine "gross proceeds" from 
which are deducted costs of production as defined in the 
statute to determine what the "net proceeds" of the mine 
are for taxation purposes. The fact that Mine "A" may 
receive more "gross proceeds" because of a more favorable 
quota assigned to it does not result in discrimination or lack 
of uniformity any more than the fact that Mine "A" may 
have received more for its ores prior to the War by reason of 
a fluctuating market. Again, we wish to call attention to the 
holding of this Court in the case of Mercur Gold Mining & 
Milling Company vs. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 52 Pac. 382, as 
follows: 
"By the term 'net annual proceeds of the mine' is meant 
what is annually realized from the product of the mine, 
over and above all the costs and expenses of obtaining 
such proceeds and converting the same into money." 
This rule has repeatedly been affirmed, not only by this 
court, but by the Federal courts. See Salt Lake County vs. Utah 
Copper Company, 294 Fed. 199. In the case of Tintic Standard 
Mining Company v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 15 P. (2d) 
633, this Court, in answering the contention that the rule for 
determining "net proceeds" had been so changed by subse-
quent legislations as to render the formula discriminatory and 
void, held: 
"There is no express limitation to prevent the Legisla-
ture from making the Constitution effective by providing 
the method by which the assessment may be made as 
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applied to the basis specified in the Constitution. When 
the 1918 constitutional amendment was adopted, the 
words 'net annual proceeds' had attained a definite and 
well-understood meaning, as including 'what is annually 
realized from the product of the mine, over and above 
all costs and expenses of obtaining such proceeds and 
converting same into money.' This meaning had been 
impressed on the words by the legislative enactment of 
1896, by judicial construction in 1898 in the case of 
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Company v. Spry, supra, 
and by actual use and application by the taxing officials 
of the state during a period of twenty-two years . . . A 
careful comparison of the statute of 1919 with the 
statute in force at the time of the adoption of the 1918 
amendment to the Constitution will show that, properly 
construed, its provisions are in harmony with the former 
statute and also in harmony with the definition of the 
term expressed in the decision of this court in Mercur 
Gold Mining and Milling Co. v. Spry, supra." 
Basically, we still have the same formula for the assessment 
of mines as was applied in the Spry case. This rule applies 
uniformly to all mines and mining claims. But it does not 
necessarily follow that every mine will have the same valuation 
by the application of this formula. In order to have the same 
valuation as Mine "B," each factor going to make up Mine 
"A"s net proceeds will have to be identical with the factors 
going to make up Mine "B"s net proceeds. We readily concede 
that the fact that the single factor of "Quota" assigned to a 
particular mine may result in one mine receiving more "gross 
proceeds" for a ton of ore than is received by another mine 
which may have a higher quota. But this does not necessarily 
result in a higher valuation for the first mine or for the mine 
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with the greater total "gross proceeds." According to the 
theory on which quotas were established, a mine with a 
lower quota (and therefore receiving greater "gross pro-
ceeds") should have higher costs of production which would 
result in less "net proceeds" on which the assessment of the 
mining property is based. 
On the other hand, a difference in Quota is not the only 
factor which may result in a difference in "gross proceeds" 
with respect to two mines similarly situated. It is a well 
recognized fact that the mining companies have different 
contracts with the smelters as to the percentage of recovery 
from the ores shipped by the different mines. Mine "A" and 
Mine "B" may be mining ore of the same quality and character, 
but Mine "A" may receive more for its ore shipped to the 
smelter because it has a more favorable contract than Mine 
"B." In other words, a carload of ore shipped from Mine "A" 
might bring a greater "price" from the smelter than the same 
carload of ore shipped from Mine "B," merely beq.use of the 
difference in the contract which the two mines might have with 
the smelter. But this certainly does not render the formula 
for determining "gross proceeds" or "net proceeds" discrimina-
tory, nor does it result in lack of uniformity of assessment. It 
does result, however, in assessing Mine "A" at a greater value 
than Mine "B," if the former has a greater net return from its 
mine production. 
It might be well to pause here to discuss some of the 
cases in which a similar question has arisen as to unif~rmity 
of assessment. In the case of Salomen v. State Tax Commis-
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sion of New York, 278 U. S. 484, 49 Sup. Ct. 192, the Supreme 
Court of the United States had before it the question of the 
validity of a New York tax against future interests in property. 
The contention was there made that such a tax was discrimin-
atory as between individuals of the same class, and that a 
different method of assessment might have been made which 
would apply more uniformly. In rejecting both of these con-
tentions the Court held: 
"The fact that a better taxing system might be con-
ceived does not render the law invalid ... To all such 
objections it may be answered that minor inequalities 
and hardships are incidents of every system of taxation 
and do not render the legislation obnoxious to the Fede-
ral Constitution. General American Tank Car Corp. v. 
Day, 270 U.S. 367, 46 Sup. Ct. 234, 70 L. Ed. 635." 
Again, in the case of Alward v. Johnson, ________ U_S. ________ , 
51 Sup Ct. 273, 75 A.L.R. 9, the constitutionality of a "gross 
receipts" tax levied by the State of California on all companies 
"owning, operating or managing automobile, truck," and other 
carrier lines. In the case in question the property replacement 
value of the taxpayer was considerably less than the receipts 
derived from its operation. This arose from the fact that 
protestant had a contract with the Federal Government for the 
carrying of mails. From receipts other than such contracts, 
there was insufficient to pay the operating costs of the carrier 
operations. The argument was made that plaintiff's ability 
to earn more with the contract than other persons could with 
the same property but without the contract, could not be 
considered in arriving at a value of his property, and that a 
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formula for arriving at "gross receipts" which took into con-
sideration receipts from such contract rendered the assessment 
against the plaintiff "confiscatory, arbitrary, excessive," and 
"does not take into consideration the actual value of the 
property involved, and was without consideration of any 
element of value except the gross earnings." This contention 
was rejected by the Supreme Court, and the statute upheld. 
Too, the inclusion of the receipts derived from the Federal 
contract was sustained. 
In Minnesota the assessment of railroads is based on their 
gross earnings. In the case of State v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 
174 Minn. 3, 218 N. W. 167, the validity of the statute was 
attacked because it appeared that certain railroads received 
huge receipts from the transporation of iron ores from the 
mines to the lakes where such ores were shipped to the smelters. 
It was argued that by the application of the formula set forth 
in the statute, one railroad might be valued at a much higher 
figure than another although the cost of building and re-
placing the roadbed of each would be the same--that insofar 
as intrinsic value was concerned each might have the same 
value, but because one railroad obtained large revenues from 
its ore contracts it would be assessed at a much higher figure. 
In repudiating the argument of the railroad, the Supreme Court 
of .Minnesota held: 
'"The taxing authorities must take gross earnings as 
they find them. They do not fix earnings . . . Large 
earnings give value, and the road has a unitary value 
which cannot be disregarded because one mile costs for 
construction more than others . . . The property of the 
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railroad is taxable at its value as a going concern. The 
ore traffic originates in Minnesota. The rate is not un-
duly competitive. The railroad which has the privilege 
of carrying the ore, whether through direct ownership 
or indirect ownership or control makes the earnings. No 
other could. Without such ownership or control or con-
tracts ore-carrying roads would not have their present 
value nor make their present great earnings. We can-
not see that the statutory scheme of taxation is uncon-
stitutional or that the tax which it imposes works a 
hardship upon the defendant through an excessive 
valuation. Such earnings give the defendant's property 
great value which reflects itself in taxes." 
Likewise, in the present cases, we might state that "net 
proceeds" or receipts of a mine give it a certain value which 
a mine receiving less "net proceeds" does not enjoy, even 
though such net earnings might be a result of a more favorable 
smelter contract, lesser costs of production, or a more favorable 
quota from the federal government on which premium pay-
ments are received. 
Another Minnesota case, Fraser v. Vermillion Mining 
Company, 175 Minn. 305, 221 S.W. 167 (appeal dismissed, 
56 Sup. Ct. 750), dealt with the proceeds derived from royal-
ties received by mine owners. The statute imposed a mining 
royalty tax which was attacked on the grounds that it would 
result in inequality of taxation because one mine operator 
might receive greater royalites than another. In upholding the 
tax, the Court held: 
"Since the tax is measured by the amounts of the 
stipulated yearly consideration paid for the permission 
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to mine, it is true that equality may not always result. 
Some leases run as low as 121;2 cents per ton mined, and 
others as high as $1.25 per ton. No doubt the uncer-
tainty of the mining value of the ore and of the varying 
estimates of the mining cost at the time the lease is made 
determine the royalty or consideration. Other factors 
enter, such as the probable future market of the ore, as 
well as its market value at the time of the lease. But 
similar variations affect all sorts of property and the 
taxation thereof. We may take as an example the opera-
tion of the gross earning tax, the validity of which is 
so well-established that no authorities need be cited. 
It is a tax imposed on the property of the owner in the 
form of a lieu tax (citing cases). It is common knowl-
edge that the tax paid by one of the railroads carrying 
the iron ore from the mines in this state when compared 
with the value of its property is many times greater than 
the tax paid by the ordinary railroad when compared to 
the value of the latter's property .... 
Mining leases usually provide for a mtmmum 
royalty to be paid whether mining is done or not, and 
some contain provisions, not in others, that the mini-
mum royalty thus paid shall be credited upon ore sub-
sequently removed. The form of the permission under 
which iron ore is being removed should not have such 
bearing upon the validity of the law laying a tax upon 
the interest of the one who grants the permission. The 
law as construed in the Marble and the Lord Cases ( 172 
Minn. 263, 215 N. W. 71, and 271 U.S. 577, 46 Sup Ct. 
627, 70 L. Ed. 1093) affords, in our opinion, no valid 
ground for claiming it to be an arbitrary and discrimin-
atory classification of property for taxation purposes." 
Other factors, than those above discussed as being in-
volved in the determination of "gross proceeds" may affect 
the determination of "net proceeds." One of such factors is 
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the cost of producing the ore (which must be deducted before 
arriving at the "net proceeds" of a mine). In the case of 
Anaconda Copper Mining Company v. Juned, 71 Mont. 132, 
227 Pac. 1001, the Board of Equalization refused to allow a 
deduction for taxes and fire insurance premiums in arriving 
at "net proceeds" of a metalliferous mine for assessment pur-
poses. (There the statute provided that only "actual costs" 
of production of the ore could be deducted.) The mining 
company took the same position that Respondents take in 
the instant cases, arguing that such a construction of the 
statute would render it unconstitutional for lack of uniformity 
of assessment. The Montana Supreme Court discusses the prob-
lem as follows: 
"Finally it is urged that, if defendant's contention 
is upheld and taxes and insurance are not deductible 
items, then the same is in conflict with section 1 of ar-
ticle 12 of the state Constitution, which provides, inter 
alia, that the Legislature shall levy a uniform rate of 
assessment and taxation and prescribe such regulations 
as shall secure a just valuation of all property. It is con-
tended that a company owning a mine and not a reduc-
tion works may be compelled to pay, in the rate charged 
for reduction, a certain portion of overhead charges in 
excess of the actual cost of reduction, and that the net 
proceeds of mines in this instance would be different 
than if a company owned a mine and also a reduction 
works. This argument also would be true in the case of 
two separate companies owning mines and each owning 
a reduction works. The actual cost of reduction may in 
one instance be greater than the other, through manage-
ment of the business and therefore the net proceeds of 
the mines in each case would be different. In either case, 
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the cost of reduction would be the money actually ex-
pended for extracting the metals and minerals from 
the ores. So, in the case of a company owning a mine 
and not a reduction works, the custom rate paid by it 
for extracting metals and minerals from ores would be 
actual cost to it. It has no control over the price charged. 
It must be paid. It is an actual cost to it, even though it 
is not an actual cost to the owner of the reduction works 
. . . Therefore we are of the opinion that our construc-
tion does not conflict with this constitutional provision. 
This provision does not demand that absolute uniform-
ity exist . . . 
We are therefore constrained to answer the ques-
tion involved herein in the negative and thereby hold 
that taxes and insurance are not deductible items in de· 
termining the net proceeds of mines." 
\'Vhat the Montana Court stated in the quotation just 
completed should resolve any doubt this Court might have 
as to the constitutionality of such a construction of our statutes 
as would include "premium payments" in the "gross proceeds" 
received from the product of Respondents' mines. The formula 
set forth by the statutes is relatively simple and will result in 
most cases in an accurate valuation of mining property. How-
ever, it appears obvious that a company which is extravagant 
in its cc:,'s of production may have a lesser valuation for 
t;:;.xation purposes than another mine which has less "gross 
proceeds," but because of efficient mining operations is able 
to keep its costs of production down. Likewise, a mining com-
pany which owns its own smelter or reduction works, might, 
as was stated in the Anaconda Copper Mining Company case, 
supra, have less costs of reduction and extraction than a similar 
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mining company which might even ship its ores to the first 
mining company for reduction or smelting and pay a higher 
amount for such services. In each instance the "actual cost" of 
such operation to the mining company is deductible in arriving 
at "net proceeds." 
Other factors than difference in quotas, which might re-
sult in a different assessment with respect to mines otherwise 
similarly situated are: 
1. Difference in smelter contracts whereby one mmmg 
company receives more favorable returns on its ores shipped 
for reduction or extraction. This has been discussed herein-
before. 
2. Difference 111 market price at the present time or at 
any time when ceiling prices were not fixed by 0. P. A. One 
mining company may hold its ores at the mine and refuse to 
ship until it receives a more favorable market price. This is 
particularly true in the case of Kennecott Copper Corporation 
as to copper mined at its Utah Copper mine. Because of its 
resources, Kennecott has been able to retain its ore for more 
favorable markets in times past, and has been able to cut down 
its other costs by large operations, efficient marketing methods, 
etc. 
3. Difference in labor costs. It is a well known fact that 
prior to organizing of laborers working for the Kennecott 
Copper Corporation, lower wages were paid by that company 
than were paid to union employees by other companies en-
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gaged in the same activities. Too, labor costs may be minim-
ized by distance over which the ore must travel to reach the 
mine portal. Many other incidental factors here might cause 
a different assessment of mines having equal production of 
ores for which the same "gross proceeds" may be received. 
4. Maintenance costs at the mine, including extending 
its workings, etc. The rule for deduction of such costs is set 
forth specifically in Seciton 80-5-57, defining "net annual pro-
ceeds." In construing such section this Court, in the case of 
Tintic Standard Mining Company v. Utah County, supra, 
refused to allow the mining company a deduction for the 
cost of acquiring certain tunnels and workings purchased from 
the Iron Blossom Mine, even though it appeared that such 
mine had not taken any deduction for such costs in the past. 
This Court, however, recognized that if the Tintic Standard 
Mining Company had developed the tunnels and workings 
in connection with its operations in mining ores, such costs 
would have been deductible under subdivisions 1 and 3 of 
Section 80-5-5 7, supra. But having purchased such workings 
as a part of a mine, they were a capital item and not a part of 
the expense of mining ore. 
5. Cost of transportation of the ore from the mine to the 
market or reduction works. Again a mnie such as the Utah 
Copper mine of the Kennecott Copper Corporation, is at a 
distinct advantage because a wholly owned subsidiary trans-
ports the ore from the mine to the reduction works and smelter. 
It very well might be that such costs are considerably below 
those to other mining companies in the same vicinity that ship 
by other means to the smelter or reduction works. 
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6. Cost of reduction, sampling, assaymg, and smelting 
and extracting the metals and minerals from the ores. This 
factor has been discussed hereinabove and the language of 
the Montana court in the Anaconda Copper Mining Company 
case, supra, reveals that while such a factor might well result 
in a different assessment for two mines otherwise similarly 
situated, such does not render the statute unconstitutional for 
lack of uniformity. 
7. Expenses of operation which are not deductible in any 
event under the provisions of Section 80-5-58, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943. Such expenses include legal expense, salaries 
paid to corporate officers, as such, or the owner or owners of 
any unincorporated mining property. This matter was resolved 
in the case of Tintic Standard Mining Company v. Utah 
County, supra, where it was determined what constituted 
salaries to corporate officers. It may very well be that one 
company will pay much of its income from mining to its cor-
porate officers in order to avoid the consequences of higher 
franchise or income taxes. nut even though its books will 
show a small net income for such taxation purposes, its "net 
proceeds" are calculated without allO\ving such deductions. 
It is thus very obvious that the factor with which this 
Court was concerned in requesting a further brief on the ques-
tion of uniformity of taxation by the inclusion of "premium 
payments" in the "gross proceeds," is only one of many factors 
which may result in one mining company being required to pay 
greater taxes because it has a greater "net proceeds" valuation. 
In each instance, the formula is applied the same, but because 
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of difference in marketing costs, amounts received for the ores, 
or in the various operating costs, one mine may end up with a 
greater or lesser "net proceeds" dependent on the application 
of the foregoing factors. How can it be argued that one factor 
is more important than another, or that one factor may result 
in discriminatory assessment while another factor will not? 
On the other hand, as was hereinbefore suggested, it 
might very well be argued that to fail to include "premium 
payments" in arriving at the "gross proceeds" of a mine would 
actually result in discrimination. A glance at the several charts 
contained in the Statement before the Tax Commission will 
reveal that very few of the mining companies of this state 
would show any "net proceeds" from the products of their 
mines without the inclusion of "premium payments." Would 
it be fair to a mining company that received little or no premium 
payments and yet, because of efficient methods of operation, 
together with low production costs, was able to show a profit 
from its operations to be required to p'ay a tax based on twice 
such net annual proceeds while another mining company was 
able to obtain a zero quota on its ore production and by a 
large scale operation and heavy costs of production receive con-
siderable premium payments, resulting in a sizeable net income 
to its stockholders, but because it took a deduction of all such 
increased costs of production from the amounts received from 
the smelters, without including "premium payments" was able 
to show a loss or no net proceeds and thereby escape taxation. 
Cert:1inly the latter mine should be required to count all of 
its receipts along with taking all of its deductions, in order to 
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make the application of the formula uniform to all mmmg 
compames. 
Not only does the inclusion of such "premium payments" 
10 the "gross proceeds" result in uniformity of assessment 
under our Statutes, but such payments were considered by the 
Federal Agencies as being a part of the "price structure" in 
connection with the sale and disposition of the ores mined. 
For this reason it was necessary for an amendment to the 
0. P. A. regulations to be adopted (Amendment No. 4, re-
ferred to heretofore in Appellants' briefs filed in both cases) 
authorizing mining companies to receive "premium payments" 
under the "Premium Payment Plan," without being in viola-
tion of the regulation governing ceiling prices on ores. To the 
same effect was the regulation permitting the inclusion of 
amounts received under "A" quotas as a part of the price 
received for such ores in determining the royalties to be paid 
under leasing contracts. And it must be remembered that in 
connection with the cases now before the court we are con-
cerned only with "A" quotas and not with "B" and "C" quotas. 
However, a similar result would be obtained as to such quotas 
and the premiums paid pursuant thereto, since all of such 
payments were made for the purpose of compensating the 
mine for work done in connection with its mininz operations, 
and were therefore offset by the deductions taken for such 
costs of operation. 
CONCLUSION 
From what has been said herein, we feel that the question 
submitted by the Court can be resolved only in favor of Appel-
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lants to the effect that the inclusion of "premium payments" 
in the "gross proceeds" derived from the products of Respon-
dents' mines will not violate the provisions of Sections 2, 3, 
and 4 of Article XIII of our State Constitution. On the other 
hand, such inclusion will result in greater uniformity of assess-
ment and result in including all receipts, whereas Respondents 
would have only part of the amount received calculated as 
"gross receipts" or "gross proceeds." 
In conclusion we wish to thank the Court for the oppor-
tunity afforded to furnish additional briefs on the question 
involved. We stand ready and willing to offer any such assis-
tance as may be possible in aid of the Court in determining 
the problem before it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Grover A. Giles, Attorney General of Utah 
Zar E. Hayes, Assistant Attorney General 
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Attorneys for Appellants. 
